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JUDGING THE NEXT EMERGENCY: 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS IN TIMES OF CRISIS 
David Cole* 
INTRODUCTION 
As virtually every law student who studies Marbury v. Madison1 
learns, Chief Justice John Marshall's tactical genius was to establish 
judicial review in a case where the result could not be challenged. As a 
technical matter, Marbury lost, and the executive branch won. As 
furious as President Jefferson reportedly was with the decision, there 
was nothing he could do about it, for there was no mandate to defy. 
The Court's decision offered no remedy for Marbury himself, whose 
rights were directly at issue, and whose rights the Court found had 
indeed been violated. But over time, it became clear that the decision 
was a landmark victory for those who consider judicial review of 
political-branch action a critical element of a constitutional system. 
Judicial review on matters of national security frequently follows 
the Marbury model. It rarely provides relief to the individuals before 
the Court when the national-security crisis is at its height. As in 
Marbury itself, the challengers generally lose, and the government 
generally wins. As a result, the conventional wisdom is that courts 
function poorly as guardians of liberty in times of crisis. Schenck,2 
Korematsu,3 and Dennis,4 from World War I, World War II, and the 
Cold War, respectively, are a few of the more notorious examples. In 
those cases, the Court authorized the criminalization of speech during 
World War I, detention based on race during World War II, and guilt 
by association during the Cold War. 
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1984, Yale University. 
- Ed. In my capacity as a volunteer staff attorney for the Center for Constitutional Rights, I 
was co-counsel in some of the cases discussed herein, including North Jersey Media Group, 
Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), Haddad v. Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. 
Mich. 2002), and Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 02-55082, 2003 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 24305 (9th Cir. Dec. 3 ,  2003). My colleague Mark Tushnet provided invaluable 
feedback, despite his evident disagreement with my position. 
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
2. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
3. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
4. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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The traditional view, based on these and other examples, holds 
that judicial review has largely failed to protect individual rights when 
their protection is most needed. There are good reasons to suspect 
that this would be so, and, as the examples cited above illustrate, there 
is plenty of evidence to support the conventional wisdom. But the 
conventional wisdom is too pessimistic. It is akin to arguing that 
Marbury demonstrates the weakness of the judiciary because the 
Court failed to afford Marbury himself relief for the violation of his 
rights. 
Considered over time, judicial review of emergency and national­
security measures can and has established important constraints on the 
exercise of emergency powers and has restricted the scope of what is 
acceptable in future emergencies. Because emergency measures 
frequently last well beyond the de facto end of the emergency, and 
because the wheels of justice move slowly, courts often have an oppor­
tunity to assess the validity of emergency measures after the emer­
gency has passed, when passions have been reduced and reasoned 
judgment is more attainable. In doing so, courts have at least some­
times been able to take advantage of hindsight to pronounce certain 
emergency measures invalid for infringing constitutional rights. And 
because courts, unlike the political branches or the political culture 
more generally, must explain their reasons in a formal manner that 
then has precedential authority in future disputes, judicial decisions 
offer an opportunity to set the terms of the next crisis, even if they 
often come too late to be of much assistance in the immediate term. 
Thus, the Court has over time developed a highly protective test for 
speech advocating illegal activity,5 subjected all racial discrimination 
since Korematsu to exacting scrutiny,6 and prohibited guilt by associa­
tion.7 These decisions, among others, impose important limits on what 
the government can do in the current, post-September 11th crisis. 
Since Marbury, scholars have devoted thousands of pages to 
debating the issue of judicial review, offering critiques of Chief Justice 
Marshall's reasoning, proposing alternative defenses of judicial review, 
and, more recently, questioning the value of judicial review altogether. 
One of the most familiar, and in my view still the strongest, defenses 
of judicial review is that first advanced in footnote four of Carotene 
Products,8 implemented by the Warren Court and given its definitive 
academic elaboration in Professor John Hart Ely's Democracy and 
Distrust.9 This is the notion that as an institution insulated from 
5. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
6. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
7. See, e.g. ,  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982). 
8. Carolene Prods. v. United States, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1944). 
9. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
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everyday politics, the Court is best suited to protect the interests of 
those who cannot protect themselves through the political process, 
whether they be members of discrete and insular minorities, dissi­
dents, noncitizens, or other vulnerable individuals. As others have 
shown, the Court does not always live up to its responsibility.10 But it is 
nonetheless an important ideal to which courts should be held 
accountable. 
How should we judge judicial review from the standpoint of pro­
tecting the constitutional rights and liberties of the vulnerable in times 
of crisis? It is in times of crisis that constitutional rights and liberties 
are most needed, because the temptation to sacrifice them in tl�e name 
of national security will be at its most acute. To government officials, 
civil rights and liberties often appear to be mere obstacles to effective 
protection of the national interest. As Bush-administration supporters 
frequently intone when defending their post-September 1 1th initia­
tives, "the Constitution is not a suicide pact."1 1  Judicial protection is 
also critical because crisis measures are typically targeted at the most 
vulnerable among us, especially noncitizens, who have little or no 
voice in the political process.12 We have been in such a crisis period 
since September 1 1th and will be for the foreseeable future. So now is 
a particularly propitious time to assess the value of judicial review in 
times of crisis.13 
Part I of this Article will set forth the traditional view that the judi­
ciary is inadequate in times of crisis, along with the evidence that 
supports it and the reasons that might explain it. Part II maintains that 
the traditional view overstates the case, because over time judicial de­
cisions have had more of a constraining influence on emergency 
measures than appears when one looks only at the courts' 
performance in the midst of a crisis. Part III surveys judicial 
performance since September 1 1th on matters of national security and 
argues that while the record is far from exemplary, courts have actu­
ally been more willing to stand up to the government in this period 
than in many prior crises. Part IV responds to a recent proposal by 
1 0. See, e.g. , GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991). 
11. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Narrow, Prudent, and Impeccable, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 1 0, 
2002. The quote comes from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). 
12. I develop this point in DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003) (hereinafter COLE, 
ENEMY ALIENS]. 
13. I will resist offering broad generalizations about judicial review. Generalizing about 
judicial review from the standpoint of how courts act in national emergencies is, to me, as 
invalid as judging the propriety of judicial review on the basis of the Supreme Court's 
performance in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). The fact that courts, like all other institu­
tions, are susceptible to political pressure in times of high crisis does not warrant a rejection 
of judicial review in general or of the ideals that animate it. I address only the somewhat 
more specific question of how judicial review works in emergencies and on matters of na­
tional security. 
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two leading scholars that courts and the Constitution ought to play less 
of a role in assessing emergency measures.14 Professors Oren Gross 
and Mark Tushnet have both recently argued that the poor perform­
ance of courts during emergency periods and the need for extraordi­
nary emergency powers should impel us to acknowledge explicitly the 
validity of extraconstitutional emergency measures and leave judg­
ment of such measures to the political rather than the judicial process. 
In my view, this proposal is fundamentally misguided, both because it 
fails to acknowledge the valuable role that courts have played, when 
viewed over time, in constraining emergency powers, and because the 
alternative of relying on the political process would almost certainly 
provide even less protection for individual rights than the courts have. 
To paraphrase Winston Churchill, judicial review is the worst protec­
tor of liberty in times of crisis, with the exception of all the others. 
I. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
The conventional wisdom is that courts are ineffective as guardians 
of liberty when the general public is clamoring for security. Clinton 
Rossiter, in an influential study of the Supreme Court in wartime, 
concluded that: 
the courts of the United States, from the highest to the lowest, can do 
nothing to restrain and next to nothing to mitigate an arbitrary presiden­
tial military program suspending the liberties of some part of the civilian 
population .... Whatever relief is afforded, and however ringing the de­
fense of liberty that goes with it, will be precious little and far too late.15 
Judge Learned Hand similarly concluded that one cannot rely on 
the courts in times when the people do not fight for their own rights: 
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon consti­
tutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes .. . .  Liberty 
lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, 
no law, nor court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even 
do much to help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no 
court to save it.16 
Justice Robert Jackson took this view so far as to advocate in 
dissent in Korematsu that the civil courts should simply refuse to en­
force military orders. Jackson famously wrote: 
14. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflec­
tions on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273. 
15. CLINTON ROSSITER & R. LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 52 (expanded ed. 1976). 
16. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED 
HAND 89-90 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1960). 
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Of course the existence of a military power resting on force, so vagrant, 
so centralized, so necessarily heedless of the individual, is an inherent 
threat to liberty. But I would not lead people to rely on this Court for a 
review that seems to me wholly delusive .... If the people ever let com­
mand of the war power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, 
the courts wield no power equal to its restraint. The chief restraint upon 
those who command the physical forces of the country, in the future as in 
the past, must be their responsibility to the political judgments of their 
contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history.17 
Finally, George Bernard Shaw gave the critique his own inimitable 
flair in offering the following evaluation of the courts during World 
War!: 
[D]uring the war the courts in France, bleeding under German guns, 
were very severe; the courts in England, hearing but the echoes of those 
guns, were grossly unjust; but the courts in the United States, knowing 
naught save censored news of those guns, were stark, staring, raving 
mad.18 
There is a wealth of evidence to support this conventional wisdom. 
During the Civil War, apart from Chief Justice. Taney's ineffectual 
solo intervention in Ex parte Merryman19 - in which he declared 
invalid President Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus, only to have 
Lincoln ignore him - the Supreme Court as a whole largely stayed 
out of the war. During World War I, the Court failed to overturn a 
single one of the more than one thousand convictions handed down 
for speaking out against the war or the draft.20 It chose to review only 
a handful of the convictions, and affirmed them all, most by a unani­
mous vote.21 In World War II, the Court upheld the Japanese 
internment and unanimously affirmed the military-tribunal convic­
tions of several German saboteurs,22 with Justice Frankfurter playing a 
lead role in crafting the majority decision despite having personally 
played a critical advisory role in creating the tribunals in the first 
place.23 In the early years of the Cold War, as well, the Court either 
17. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
18. See Ex parte Starr, 263 F. 145, 147 (D. Mont. 1920). Justice Brennan has advanced 
much the same evaluation. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a 
Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 11 ,  1 1  
(1988) ("There is . . .  a good deal t o  be embarrassed about, when one reflects on the shabby 
treatment civil liberties have received in the United States during times of perceived threats 
to its national security.") . 
19. 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861) (No. 9487). 
20. COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 12, at 12-13. 
21. Id. 
22. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
23. Melvin I. Urofsky, Inter Arma Silent Leges: Extrajudicial Activity, Patriotism and the 
Rule of Law, in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW: THE AMERICAN HOME FRONT IN WORLD 
WAR II 27 (Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew eds., 2002). 
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denied review or affirmed anti-Communist measures, thereby allowing 
guilt by association to operate largely unchecked.24 
There are at least four reasons why courts are likely to fare poorly 
on matters of national security, especially in times of crisis. First, their 
independence notwithstanding, judges are part of the government and 
are likely to identify with the government's interests when matters of 
national security are at stake. The populace as a whole generally 
rallies around the executive branch in times of crisis, and courts are 
likely to do so as well. As history has shown, judges cannot stand 
above the crisis, precisely because the threat at least presumably 
implicates them as well - both as part of the government and as part 
of the society. 
Second, assessing claims of national security, especially during 
times of crisis, is inherently difficult, and judges are likely to feel 
ill-equipped to do so. Most questions of constitutional rights and liber­
ties present a question of balancing. Even the prohibition on race dis­
crimination can be overcome by a sufficiently compelling justification 
and narrowly tailored means.25 But how does one accurately measure 
the risk that Al Qaeda might gain critical information enabling it to 
attack us, or that an individual, if set free, might endanger the national 
security? 
Such decisions must inevitably rest on incomplete information, and 
the courts' information is often even more incomplete than that of the 
executive. The executive branch frequently has a monopoly on the 
information because so much of it is classified, the challengers are 
often unable to respond, and, absent adversarial testing, it is difficult 
for a court to know whether the government has been fully candid in 
its assessment. The Supreme Court's decision in Korematsu, in which 
it deferred to military claims of necessity as justification for the 
Japanese internment, was later shown to be based on an inaccurate 
record; the executive branch concealed from the Court critical infor­
mation about its own doubts concerning the reality of the threat posed 
by the Japanese population. Indeed, the executive branch's misrepre­
sentations were so fundamental that years later courts overturned the 
convictions on writs of coram nobis.26 
Third, courts must worry that if they rule against the government 
on a matter of national security, they may face a potential test of their 
credibility and legitimacy. If the Pre$ident truly believes that the secu-
24. ARTHUR J. SABIN, IN CALMER TIMES: THE SUPREME COURT AND RED MONDAY 
90-105 (1999); William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: 
The Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 375, 428-34. 
25. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
26. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 604-08 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu v. 
United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1419 (N.D. Cal. 1984). See generally PETER IRONS, 
JUSTICE AT WAR (1983). 
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rity of the nation is at stake, it is entirely possible that he will defy any 
decision against him.27 During the Civil War, for example, when Chief 
Justice Taney in Ex parte Merryman28 ruled that President Lincoln's 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was unconstitutional and 
granted a writ of habeas corpus, the military refused to produce the 
petitioner. Justice Taney then issued an attachment for contempt, but 
the military refused to accept service of that order. President Lincoln 
simply ignored Justice Taney's decision altogether. 
Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, judges must worry that if 
they rule against the government, their decisions might be followed, at 
some subsequent cost to national security. Just as no judge wants to be 
the one who has freed a defendant to commit violent crime again, so 
no judge wants to issue an order that actually causes serious harm to 
the national security. And since prognostications about security risks 
are just that, and one can never really be certain, judges may be 
inclined to err on the side of caution and the government. At the oral 
argument before the Third Circuit in North Jersey Media Group v. 
Ashcroft,29 a case challenging the constitutionality of the Attorney 
General's decision to close to the public all immigration proceedings 
involving hundreds of detainees labeled of "special interest" to the 
September 1 1th investigation, Judge Morton Greenberg told the 
ACLU lawyer arguing the case, "We could make a decision here . . .  
and people could die. Lots of people . . .  I saw the second hit [during 
the World Trade Center attack of September 1 1th] , and I can't erase it 
from my mind. "30 
II. A REVISIONIST VIEW 
While there are undoubtedly good reasons and plenty of evidence 
to support the conventional wisdom that courts perform poorly on 
matters of national security, that judgment ultimately rests on too 
narrow a focus - namely, an assessment of how the courts have 
performed in the midst of particular crises for the particular litigants 
before them. When one asks instead what role judicial decisions have 
played over time in framing the options available to the executive 
branch in emergency periods, a less pessimistic evaluation is 
warranted. The Supreme Court's decisions during the waning of 
emergencies, or after the emergencies have ended, have not infre­
quently called into question or reversed its earlier rulings and have 
27. See LOUIS SMITH, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY POWER 266 (1951). 
28. 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861). 
29. 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002). 
30. Arguments Made on Deportation Hearing Regs, PA. L. WKLY, Sept. 23, 2002, at 9 
(quoting Judge Greenberg). 
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created precedents that impose a degree of restraint on the govern­
ment's actions during the next emergency. 
After the Civil War ended and President Lincoln was buried, for 
example, the Supreme Court issued Ex parte Milligan,31 in which it de­
clared that, as long as the civil courts remained open for business, the 
President did not have constitutional authority to try a United States 
citizen by military tribunal for allegedly conspiring with the enemy. 
The Court broadly insisted that the Constitution applies equally in, 
peacetime and wartime: 
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, 
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection 
all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, 
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of 
man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the 
great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy 
or depotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for 
the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, 
which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily proved 
by the result of the great effort to throw off its just authority.32 
At the close of World War II, the Court decided Duncan v. 
Kohanamoku,33 which, like Ex parte Milligan, imposed limits on 
martial law by invalidating a conviction of a civilian in a military tri­
bunal in Hawaii. The Court reasoned, as in Milligan, that trial by mili­
tary tribunal was barred as long as the civil courts were open. Notably, 
however, the Court delayed issuing a decision in Kohanamoku until 
more than a year after it agreed to hear the case, leading one contem­
poraneous commentator to speculate that the Court had purposefully 
waited until it was clear that martial law would not have to be 
reimposed in Hawaii.34 
Similarly, while the Court consistently upheld the harsh suppres­
sion of antiwar speech during World War I,35 it subsequently devel­
oped increasingly stronger versions of the "clear and present danger" 
test for protecting subversive speech. In Yates v. United States,36 de­
cided two and one-half years after Senator Joseph McCarthy had been 
31. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
32. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 120-21 ;  see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 
290 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1934) ("(The Constitution's] grants of power to the Federal 
Government and its limitations of the power of the States were determined in the light of 
emergency and they are not altered by emergency . . .  even the war power does not remove 
constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties"). 
33. 327 U.S. 304 (1946). 
34. EDWIN CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 104-05 (1947). 
35. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 332-33 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 
250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209-10  (1919); Schenck v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1 919). 
36. 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
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censured, the Court required the government to prove advocacy of ac­
tion, not merely advocacy of abstract doctrine. That ruling put an end 
to the ongoing use of the 1940 Smith Act37 to criminalize Communist 
Party leaders for their advocacy.38 Still later, in 1969, the Court 
adopted an even more speech-protective test in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
holding that speech advocating illegal conduct is constitutionally pro­
tected unless it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action and is likely to incite or produce such action."39 That test 
forecloses virtually any prosecution for speech advocating crime short 
of an actual conspiracy to commit crime. With these rulings, the 
Court's First Amendment doctrine now imposes significant limits on 
the government's ability to restrict speech in times of emergency or as 
a matter of national security. Thus, even though the Court did little to 
help antiwar activists Schenck, Debs, Frohwerk, and Abrams during 
World War I,40 or to stand up to McCarthyism at its height, the Court 
ultimately adopted an interpretation of the First Amendment that pro­
tects the rights of latter-day Schencks and Communists to speak as 
they wish, so much so that outright censorship of antiwar speech is no 
longer a plausible option for the government in wartime. 
Supreme Court decisions have also largely barred another 
common tactic of emergency government - guilt by association. In 
emergencies, authorities seeking to prevent future harm often resort 
to guilt by association because it permits the imposition of guilt with­
out proof that an individual has committed a specific violent act.41 
When the Court in Yates effectively foreclosed prosecutions of 
Communists under the Smith Act's advocacy provisions, federal 
prosecutors turned to that statute's "membership" provisions. But in 
Scales v. United States,42 the Court interpreted the membership provi­
sions to require proof not merely of membership, but of "specific 
intent" to further the organization's illegal ends.43 Driven by concerns 
that guilt by association violates both the First and Fifth Amendments, 
the Court ruled that individuals could not be prosecuted for mere 
membership in the Communist Party, nor even for active membership 
supporting its lawful ends. Instead, the Court held that the govern­
ment must prove that an individual's Party activities were specifically 
37. Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670. 
38. See SABIN, supra note 24, at 169-70 (discussing the effect of the Yates decision). 
39. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
40. See supra note 35. 
41. See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2003) (discussing reliance on guilt by association in pre­
ventive law enforcement). 
42. 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
43. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 220 (1961). 
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intended to further criminal conduct - in effect, that he had con­
spired to commit or support crime. The Court subsequently extended 
that principle broadly, ruling that absent proof of specific intent, the 
state could not use association to deny security clearances for work in 
defense facilities, passports for travel abroad, teaching positions, 
admission to the bar, or even the use of campus meeting rooms by 
student groups.44 Thus, while the Court did little to block the imposi­
tion of guilt by association during the early years of the Cold War, its 
later decisions stemming from that period largely prohibit that tactic 
today.45 
The Vietnam War era also resulted in important judicial decisions 
limiting or rejecting claims of national security. The Vietnam War did 
not present the same sort of direct threat to national security that was 
felt during the World Wars and the Cold War. But it nonetheless 
prompted substantial government incursions on liberties and also pro­
duced two landmark national-security cases, both of which resulted in 
decisions against the government. In New York Times Co. v. United 
States,46 the Court in 1971 permitted the publication of the Pentagon 
Papers over the government's claim that disclosure of this secret 
account of the Vietnam War would harm national security. The 
44. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982) (holding 
membership in NAACP insufficient basis for tort liability absent proof of specific intent); 
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186-87 (1972) (finding association with Students for 
Democratic Socialism insufficient basis for denying use of campus meeting rooms); United 
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967) (holding government could not deny Communist 
Party members security clearances for work in defense facilities absent proof that they had 
specific intent to further the Party's unlawful ends); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 
589, 606 (1967) ("[m]ere knowing membership without a specific intent to further the unlaw­
ful aims of an organization is not a constitutionally adequate basis" for barring employment 
in state university system to Communist Party members); Apatheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 
U.S. 500, 5 14 (1964) (finding Communist Party membership insufficient basis for denying 
passport). 
45. This claim is subject to an important qualification. While the war on terrorism has 
not thus far led to the direct criminalization of membership per se in political groups, the 
government has resurrected the tactic of "guilt by association" in the name of cutting off ter­
rorist financing. Under a 1996 antiterrorism statute, it is a crime to provide "material sup­
port" to designated "terrorist organizations," without regard to the intent, purpose, or effect 
of one's support. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 303(a), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 23398 (2003). Under this statute, it is no defense to show that one's support was in fact 
intended to support only nonviolent humanitarian activities, nor even to show that one's 
support was designed to and did in fact reduce a recipient group's reliance on violence. One 
court of appeals has held that this statute does not violate the prohibition on guilt by associa­
tion because it punishes not membership per se, but acts of material support. Humanitarian 
Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1 130 (9th Cir. 2000). In my view, this exalts form over sub­
stance. What good is the right of association if one has no right to provide any kind of sup­
port to the group with which one associates? See generally David Cole, Hanging with the 
Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of Association, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203. 
At the same time, the existence of Supreme Court precedents strongly condemning guilt by 
association preclude punishing membership itself and provide strong arguments against this 
new version of associational guilt. 
46. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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following year, in United States v. United States District Court,47 the 
Court held that the Attorney General lacked power under the 
Constitution to authorize warrantless "domestic security" wiretaps. 
Both cases reflected a skepticism about claims of national security and 
executive prerogative, and created significant constraints on the gov­
ernment's ability to enforce secrecy and to conduct searches and 
wiretaps without probable cause of criminal activity. 
The Court's decision in Korematsu provides the most conspicuous 
counterexample to this more optimistic take on the Court's role in 
reviewing national-security measures. By the time that case was 
decided, according to Clinton Rossiter, "the military areas had been 
disestablished and the relocation centers were being broken up. "48 Yet 
the Court upheld the internment by a vote of six to three and has 
never reversed the decision. Pessimists might well point to Korematsu 
as an example of a judicial decision having the opposite effect from 
that which I have been emphasizing - as Justice Jackson warned at 
the time, Korematsu might well have paved the way for future inroads 
on civil rights and liberties in times of crisis.49 But Korematsu's legacy 
suggests that Jackson's concern may have been overstated. While the 
decision has not been formally overruled, eight of the Supreme 
Court's sitting Justices have said that the case was wrongly decided.50 
Justice Scalia, perhaps the Court's most conservative member, has 
compared the decision to Dred Scott.51 In short, Korematsu has not 
proved to be the "loaded weapon" that Justice Jackson feared. To the 
contrary, it has served as an object lesson in what the Court and the 
government ought not do in future crises. 
Thus, when one takes a longer view of the role of courts in con­
straining emergency powers, the picture is less bleak than the conven­
tional account admits. While most of the developments discussed 
above came too late to forestall civil rights and civil liberties violations 
when they were initially undertaken, they have the prophylactic effect 
of forestalling the same or similar measures in future emergencies. 
The judicial process is especially conducive to playing this role for 
several reasons. First, since emergency powers, and the disputes to 
which they give rise, tend to outlast the actual emergency, those 
powers can be reviewed by courts when the worst of the crisis is over. 
47. 407 U .S. 232 (1972). 
48. CLINTON ROSSITER & RICHARD P. LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
COMMANDER IN CHIEF (1976). 
49. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (ar­
guing that the principle underlying the Korematsu decision "lies about like a loaded weapon 
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent 
need"). 
50. See COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 12, at 99, 261 n.42 (citing cases). 
51 .  Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Thus, the Court's liberty-protective decisions in Milligan and Kaha­
namoku came when the wars were effectively over, and the Court's 
protective decisions from the Cold War period began after McCarthy 
had been censured and the height of anticommunist fervor had passed. 
The ability (and obligation) of courts to assess the legality of measures 
long after they have been adopted means that courts may bring more 
perspective to the question than those acting in the midst of the emer­
gency. 
Second, the fact that legal decisions must offer a statement of rea­
sons that then binds future cases contributes to the judiciary's ability 
to exert control over the next emergency. The obligation to create and 
to follow precedent means that judicial decisions are likely to have a 
longer "shelf life" than those of other branches of government. The 
lawyers' ability to distinguish the current emergency from prior ones, 
and the current emergency measure from those previously invalidated, 
means that the obligation to state reasons is no guarantee of future 
effectiveness in protecting rights, but precedents do tend to take cer­
tain options off the table. The government could not punish antiwar 
speech today, for example. 
Third, the common-law method facilitates a measured develop­
ment of rules in the context of specific cases and permits the incorpo­
ration of lessons learned from the early and often most overreactive 
stages of emergencies. Once those lessons are learned and instantiated 
in Supreme Court decisions, they play an important role in precluding 
certain measures that were part of the government's arsenal in the 
prior emergency. In this sense, just as in Marbury, the Court's emer­
gency-powers decisions may not help the parties immediately before it 
at the height of the controversy, but in the long run these decisions es­
tablish principles that are critical to checking future government 
abuse. 
Fourth, the formalities of the judicial process mandate the creation 
of an official record that may facilitate reaching a just result. The 
conviction in Korematsu was ultimately overturned on a writ of coram 
nobis because Korematsu was able to show, through access to gov­
ernment records, that the Justice Department had misled the courts 
about the strength of the evidence underlying its national-security 
concerns. As the warrant requirement demonstrates, record-keeping 
requirements permit evaluation of government actions after the fact. 
While judicial proceedings are not necessary to impose record-keeping 
requirements, the highly formalized judicial process itself creates a 
record that may make subsequent assessments, beyond the heat of the 
moment, more reliable. 
Fifth, and perhaps most important, federal courts are independent 
of the political process, and their institutional self-definition turns in 
significant part on that independence, especially when it comes to the 
interpretation and enforcement of constitutional rights. As a result, 
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they are better suited to entertain claims challenging executive action 
than are Congress or the executive branch itself, and more likely to 
take politically unpopular positions than the political branches. While, 
as noted above, judges, like other government officials, are likely to 
defer to the executive branch on matters of national security, complete 
deference is likely to clash with their understanding of their role as 
j udges. 
To be sure, judicial decisions are not the only forces that may 
constrain government actors in the next emergency. Developing 
cultural norms may also play a role. As noted above, Korematsu has 
never been formally overruled, but it is nonetheless highly unlikely 
that anything on the scale of the Japanese internment would happen 
again. The cultural condemnation of that initiative, reflected in 
Congress's issuance of a formal apology and restitution,52 has been so 
powerful that the option is a nonstarter even without controlling 
Supreme Court law. But even here, the legislative apology followed 
j udicial decisions nullifying the convictions on writs of coram nobis.53 
In addition, the formal requirements that judges give reasons that are 
binding on future judges means that judicial decisions are likely to 
play a more specific constraining function than the development of 
cultural norms. Indeed, John Finn has argued that the obligation to 
give reasons is constitutive of constitutionalism and underscores the 
necessity of judicial review to any meaningful system of constitutional 
law.54 Cultural norms and political initiatives are rarely as clear-cut as 
a legal prohibition, and their very contestability means that they are 
likely to exert less restraining force than a judicial holding. Court deci­
sions are, of course, also contestable, but generally along a narrower 
range of alternatives. 
Thus, the conventional wisdom that courts perform poorly in crises 
should be qualified by the important proviso that, when viewed over 
time, judicial decisions do exert a constraining effect on what the gov­
ernment may do in the next emergency. 
III. SEPTEMBER 11 TH AND THE COURTS 
How have the courts fared since September 1 1th? As Judge 
Greenberg's comments at the oral argument in North Jersey Media 
Group illustrate,55 the attacks of that day and the threat of future 
52. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903. 
53. See supra note 26. 
54. JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 33 (1991) ("Some type of constitutional review is a constitutive element of constitu­
tionalism, for the activity of review, the very possibility of review, is predicated upon the ne­
cessity to produce reasons in support of action taken."). 
55. See Arguments Made on Deportation Hearing Regs, supra note 30. 
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catastrophes place tremendous pressure on judges. Nonetheless, a 
surprising number of judicial decisions initially upheld claims of con­
stitutional rights against official antiterrorist measures. As time went 
on, the picture began to look more familiar, as courts increasingly 
deferred to government claims of national security. As of this writing, 
the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in, and therefore all judgments 
are necessarily preliminary. 
Nonetheless, given the history of judicial deference in times of 
crisis, the early decisions were quite stunning. In Center for National 
Security Studies v. United States Department of Justice,56 a federal dis­
trict court ruled that the Justice Department's secret arrests of hun­
dreds of persons detained in a preventive detention campaign after 
September 11th violated the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 
and ordered the government to disclose the detainees' names. 
In several cases challenging the government's related practice of 
closing to the public all immigration proceedings involving detainees 
connected to the September 1 1th investigations, two district courts 
ruled that this practice violated the First Amendment right of access of 
the public,57 and one court ruled that it also violated a detainee's Fifth 
Amendment due process right to a public hearing.58 The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit unanimously affirmed one of 
the First Amendment rulings, writing that "democracies die behind 
closed doors. "59 
A federal district judge in New York reviewing the government's 
treatment of a September 11th suspect, Osama Awadallah, issued a 
pair of rulings lambasting the government's tactics.60 The judge ruled 
that the government had abused the "material witness" statute61 by 
employing it to hold a witness for a grand jury proceeding rather than 
for a criminal trial, had lied to obtain the material witness warrant, 
and had physically abused Awadallah while in custody. The court 
dismissed all charges against Awadallah, and ordered his release. 
A district court ruled in October 2001 that a federal statute making 
it a crime to provide "personnel" and "training" to designated "for­
eign terrorist organizations"62 was unconstitutionally vague, reasoning 
56. 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002), modified, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
57. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 948 (E.D. Mich. 2002), aff d, 303 F.3d 
681 (6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002), 
rev'd, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002). 
58. Haddad v. Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
59. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). 
60. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 349 F.3d 42 
(2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 349 
F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003). 
61.  18 u.s.c. § 3144 (2000). 
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000). 
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that these terms appear to prohibit clearly protected First Amendment 
activity on behalf of disfavored organizations.63 In December 2003, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed that 
decision and also ruled, by a two to one vote, that in order to satisfy 
due process, a mens rea requirement must be read into the material 
support statute.64 In January 2004, a district court in a related case 
declared unconstitutional a USA PATRIOT Act provision criminal­
izing the provision of "expert advice and assistance" to terrorist 
groups.65 These provisions have proved to be the linchpin of the 
government's domestic war on terrorism.66 In August 2003, another 
federal judge declared unconstitutional the ban on providing "person­
nel" and "communications" to terrorist organizations, in one of the 
Justice Department's most highly publicized post-September 1 1th 
antiterrorist prosecutions, against the lawyer and translators for 
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman.67 
In May 2002, the federal judges authorized to issue warrants for 
searches and electronic wiretaps under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act ("FISA"),68 sitting as one court, ruled that the mini­
mization provisions of that statute barred criminal prosecutors from 
directing foreign intelligence investigations and applications for 
warrants.69 The court cited numerous problems it had experienced 
under the statute, including the fact that the government had on 
seventy-five prior occasions provided the court with misleading or 
inaccurate information.70 
The district courts hearing challenges to the detentions of 
American citizens Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla, who were being held 
as "enemy combatants," also rejected sweeping assertions that the de­
tainees had no right to see a lawyer or to obtain judicial review of their 
detentions. In Hamdi, District Judge Robert G. Doumar rejected the 
government's position that habeas corpus review was unavailable, 
insisted that judicial review was required, and sharply dismissed the 
63. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, No. CV 98-1971 ABC (BQRx), 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16729 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2001), modified sub norn. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. 
Dep't of Justice, No. 02-55082, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24305 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003). 
64. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 02-55082, 2003 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 24305 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003). 
65. Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, No. CV-03-6107, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 926 
(U.S. Jan. 22, 2004). 
66. See COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 12, at 75-76, 256 n.11 .  
67.  United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), 2003 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 12531 
(S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2003). 
68. so u.s.c. §§ 1801-1863 (2000). 
69. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. 
Supp. 2d 611 (U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. 2002). 
70. Id. at 620. 
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government's submission of a two-page declaration from a 
government bureaucrat based on unidentified hearsay as insufficient 
to establish the propriety of detaining Hamdi.71 In an early appeal, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the most 
conservative federal appellate court in the nation, similarly rejected 
the government's "sweeping contention" that the President could, 
without judicial review, designate citizens as enemy combatants and 
hold them indefinitely.72 
The district court hearing a habeas action on behalf of Padilla 
similarly ruled that it could review the legality of the detention. And 
over strong objections from the military, the court also ordered that 
Padilla, who has been held incommunicado, must be granted access to 
his attorney for purposes of challenging his detention.73 On appeal, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit went even further, ruling 
that the President lacked any authority to hold citizens as enemy com­
batants absent express authorization from Congress.74 
In December 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that the foreign nationals held as enemy combat­
ants in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have a right to seek habeas corpus 
review in federal court of the legality of their detentions.75 
Several other lower courts had previously held to the contrary, but in 
November 2003, the Supreme Court granted review of two such lower 
court decisions over the opposition of the executive branch.76 In 
January 2004, the Court also agreed to hear Yaser Hamdi's claims that 
he was being held unlawfully as an enemy combatant, again over the 
opposition of the executive branch, which had urged the Court to deny 
certiorari.77 Thus, in an area where the administration initially asserted 
unilateral authority to detain, unreviewable by the courts, the 
Supreme Court has now agreed to exercise review. What that review 
will consist of remains to be seen, of course. But the very fact that the 
Court agreed to hear the cases over the executive branch's opposition 
is significant. 
71 .  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd, 316 F.3d 450 (4th 
Cir. 2002). 
72. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002). 
73. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 
243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (reaffirming earlier decision and denying motion for re­
consideration). 
74. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003). 
75. Gherebi v. Bush, No. 03-55785, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25625 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 
2003). 
76. Al Odah v. United States, No. 03-343, 124 S. Ct. 534 , 2003 WL 22070725 (U.S. Nov. 
10, 2003) (granting certiorari). 
77. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696, 124 S. Ct. 981 , 2004 WL 42546 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004) 
(granting certiorari). 
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In two of the most prominent prosecutions in the war on terrorism, 
those charging French citizen Zacarias Moussaoui with involvement in 
the September 11th conspiracy and American citizen John Walker 
Lindh with aiding Al Qaeda and conspiring to kill Americans, federal 
courts ruled, again over strenuous objections from the government, 
that the defendants must be granted access to enemy combatant 
detainees who allegedly had exculpatory evidence about the defen­
dants.7s Shortly after the district court in the Lindh case issued that 
ruling, the government agreed to drop all terrorism charges in 
exchange for a plea of guilty to a lesser charge.79 In the Moussaoui 
case, the government has appealed the district court's ruling and has 
suggested that if it does not prevail, it may remove Moussaoui's case 
from the criminal process to a military tribunal.so 
Four federal judges have declared unconstitutional a regulation 
issued shortly after September 11th that gives immigration "prosecu­
tors," or district directors, the power to keep a foreign national in 
custody when the immigration judge presiding over the case has found 
no basis for detention and ordered release on bond.s1 All four courts 
found that the regulation violated due process by permitting preven­
tive detention where no showing of flight risk or danger to the 
community had been made. 
These decisions suggest an increasing willingness on the part of 
judges to question broad assertions of national security. At the same 
time, other decisions, including subsequent decisions in several of the 
same cases, fit the more traditional model of deference. The Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the blanket closure of immigra­
tion hearings,s2 and the Supreme Court denied a petition for certio­
rari.s3 A specially convened court of appeals, after entertaining a 
one-sided secret appeal by the government, reversed the unanimous 
decision of the PISA judges imposing limits on criminal prosecutors' 
role in PISA investigations and also ruled that the USA PATRIOT 
78. See United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 2003); Katherine Q. Seelye, 
War on Terror Makes for Odd Twists in Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2002, at Al6. 
79. United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002); Jane Mayer, Lost in the 
Jihad: Why Did the Government's Case Against John Walker Lindh Collapse?, NEW 
YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50. 
80. Toni Locy, Moussaoui Clash Tests Future of Terror Trials, USA TODAY, July 21, 
2003, at 2A; Susan Schmidt, Prosecution of Moussaoui Nears a Crossroad: Facing Demands 
for Witness Testimony, Government May Turn Suspect Over to U.S. Military, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 21, 2003, at A8. 
81. Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp. 2d 662 (D.N.J. 2003); Uritsky v. Ridge, 286 F. Supp. 2d 
842 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Bezmen v. Ashcroft, 245 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D. Conn. 2003); Almonte­
Vargas v. Elwood, No. 02-CV-2666, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12387 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002). 
82. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003). 
83. 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003). 
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Act's expansion of FISA posed no Fourth Amendment problems.84 
Again, the Supreme Court denied review.85 
The Fourth Circuit in a later appeal in the Hamdi case essentially 
gave the government what the court earlier said it would not counte­
nance - the power to detain without any meaningful judicial review. 
The Fourth Circuit upheld Hamdi's detention on the basis of nothing . 
more than what it characterized as the "undisputed" fact that Hamdi 
had been captured on the battlefield abroad and refused to allow 
Hamdi to participate in the review.86 (The court did not explain how 
the circumstances of Hamdi's capture could be disputed or undisputed 
when Hamdi was unable to participate in the proceeding, and the 
lawyers representing his interests had no basis for knowing where he 
was captured). 
And with the exception of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gherebi, 
federal courts have refused even to consider habeas corpus petitions 
challenging the detention of foreign enemy combatants at Guan­
tanamo Bay, although the Supreme Court has agreed to review the 
threshold jurisdictional question on whether the courts have any 
power to entertain the habeas claims.87 
' 
After the Awadallah decision,88 another judge in the same federal 
district ruled that the material witness statute was properly employed · 
to detain witnesses to testify in grand jury proceedings and was not 
limited to criminal cases.89 The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit subsequently reversed the lower court decision in A wadallah 
and reinstated the perjury charges against Awadallah.90 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the FOIA 
decision requiring disclosure of the names of the September 11th 
detainees, over a spirited dissent by Judge David Tatel.91 Finally, the 
federal courts have uniformly dismissed constitutional concerns raised 
by two Muslim charities whose assets have been frozen on vague 
84. Jn re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717 (U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Ct. of Review 2002). 
85. ACLU v. United States, 538 U.S. 920 (2003). 
86. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004). 
87. See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 
S. Ct. 534 (2003);  Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1 153 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 
S. Ct. 2073 (2003). 
. 
88. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd 349 F.3d 42 
(2d Cir. 2003). 
89. Jn re the Application of the United States for a Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. 
Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
90. Awada/lah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003). 
91. Ctr. for Nat'! Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004). 
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charges of support for terrorism under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act.92 
It is too early to draw firm conclusions regarding the role of courts 
in the war on terrorism; we are, after all, still in the initial stages of this 
crisis, when courts are historically deferential, and the Supreme Court 
has not yet weighed in. The lower courts' greater willingness to chal­
lenge the government's national-security assertions may reflect the 
fact that the buck does not stop with those courts; any ruling against 
the government in this area is likely to be but one stop along the road 
to appeal. The Supreme Court was able to reach the result it did 
in Marbury in part because it left the President with nothing to defy, 
and thereby created the space to · announce its doctrine of judicial 
supremacy. So, too, a district court decision on a matter of national se­
curity is unlikely to be the judiciary's last word, and therefore it may 
be easier for a district court to rule against the government's national­
security assertions. The further up the appellate chain, the more likely 
a judicial decision will be determinative, and consequently, the more 
pressure judges may feel to uphold the government's actions. 
Cultural factors may also play a role in the marginally increased 
willingness of courts to question the government's national-security 
initiatives. As Jack Goldsmith and Cass Sunstein have argued, 
President Bush's order authorizing military tribunals sparked a much 
more critical public reaction than did President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt's use of military tribunals during World War 11.93 They 
attribute the change to an increasing distrust of government in the 
wake of Vietnam and Watergate, and to a "massively strengthened 
commitment to individual rights" in our constitutional law.94 
Without a doubt, the Vietnam era, and especially the revelations of 
FBI abuses targeted at antiwar and civil rights protesters during that 
period, effected a seismic shift in public and judicial attitudes toward 
executive power and national-security claims.95 Before Vietnam, J. 
Edgar Hoover was a national hero; today his name is shorthand for 
politically motivated government repression. The abuses of 
COINTELPRO, including extensive wiretapping of Dr. Martin Luther 
92. See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 
2002), aff d, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 
2d 779 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff d, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Global 
Relief Found., Inc. v. Snow, 124 S. Ct. 531 (2003). 
93. Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a 
Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMM. 261 (2003). 
94. Id. at 282. 
95. See generally SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE 
ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK III, FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT 
COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE 
ACTIVITIES, S. REP. No. 94-755 (1976); FRANK DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE: 
THE AIMS AND METHODS OF AMERICA'S POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM (1980). 
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King, Jr., infiltration and disruption of lawful political organizations 
through "dirty tricks," secret warrantless searches, and the compiling 
of extensive records on the Bureau's critics, all undertaken under the 
rubric of "national security," have given the public and the media 
good reason to be skeptical about assertions of unchecked executive 
power. 
Significantly, the Supreme Court itself took part in that transfor­
mation, as it permitted the publication of the Pentagon Papers,96 held 
unconstitutional warrantless "domestic security" wiretaps,97 and 
rejected President Nixon's broad assertions of executive privilege in 
connection with the Watergate prosecutions.98 In each of these cases, 
the Court stood up to the government, and its public reputation was 
enhanced as a result. That experience may well play a role in the 
courts' apparently greater willingness to challenge the government in 
the current era.99 
A third factor may be the dramatically increased presence of 
human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, and immigrants' rights groups. · 
During the Cold War, for example, the American Civil Liberties 
Union, the organization one might expect to be defending the 
Communists, was busy purging itself of Communists. HJO  The National 
Lawyers Guild was one of the few legal organizations to defend 
Communists' rights, and the Attorney General and the Director of the 
FBI targeted it as a Communist front organization for its efforts.101 
Today, by contrast, the ACLU has been a vigorous defender of 
civil liberties, and it stands among a broad spectrum of organizations 
and institutions that have spoken out for the need to respect civil 
liberties in the war on terrorism. These include human rights organiza­
tions such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and 
the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights; civil liberties and civil 
rights groups such as the Center for Constitutional Rights, the 
National Lawyers Guild, the National Committee to Protect Political 
Freedom, and the Center for National Security Studies; immigrants' 
rights and ethnicity-based groups such as the American-Arab 
96. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
97. United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 232 (1972). 
98. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
99. Coincidentally, the district court judge who initially barred the use of "domestic se­
curity" wiretaps, Judge Damon Keith, also wrote the decision for the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit declaring unconstitutional John Ashcroft's blanket closure of immigration 
hearings. 
100. See SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A H ISTORY OF THE 
ACLU 173-216 (1990). 
101. Id. at 177, 264-65; see also ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN 
MODERN AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO THE PRESENT 364 (1978); ATHAN G. THEOHARIS & 
JOHN STUART Cox, THE BULL: J. EDGAR HOOVER AND THE GREAT AMERICAN 
INQUISITION 21 8-19 (1 988). 
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Anti-Discrimination Committee, the American Immigration Lawyers' 
Association, the Asian American Legal Defense Fund, the National 
Immigration Forum, and the Japanese American Citizens League; 
grassroots organizing groups such as the Bill of Rights Defense 
Committees; religious groups such as the Muslim Public Affairs 
Council and the Council on American Islamic Relations; electronic 
privacy-focused groups such as the Center for Democracy and 
Technology and the Electronic Privacy Information Center; and liber­
tarian organizations such as the Cato Institute. Most of these groups 
did not even exist during the Cold War. Their active and vocal pres­
ence today creates opportunities for grassroots involvement and 
education; generates reports and press releases on civil liberties 
abuses; gives voice to those who would otherwise be voiceless; and 
brings both domestic and international media attention to the 
government's excesses.102 That in turn affects the broader culture of 
concern about rights, which may lead courts to be more attentive than 
they might otherwise be to concerns on the liberty side of the security­
liberty balance. 
In short, while courts remain no panacea, we ought not dismiss 
them too quickly, as they have the potential to play a critical role in 
checking emergency powers. 
IV. AN UNTIMELY PROPOSAL 
Despite these developments, some commentators have recently 
argued that the Constitution and, by extension, the courts ought not 
play much of a role at all in restricting the government's emergency 
powers. Professors Oren Gross and Mark Tushnet have each proposed 
that in light of the failure of constitutional constraints to limit execu­
tive action during emergencies, it might be better to recognize explic­
itly the validity of extraconstitutional measures during emergencies, or 
put differently, to acknowledge that emergency powers are not gov­
erned by the Constitution. 103 Both do so in large part to avoid tainting 
102. One initiative in particular has appeared to be especially influential. Soon after the 
USA PATRIOT Act was enacted, the Bill of Rights Defense Committee formed to pursue a 
grassroots strategy of getting local towns and counties to adopt resolutions condemning the 
civil liberties abuses of the Patriot Act. As of February 2004, 242 jurisdictions had adopted 
such resolutions, including three states - Hawaii, Alaska, and Vermont - and several 
major cities, including Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Baltimore, San Francisco, and 
Albuquerque. See Bill of Rights Def. Comm., http:l/www.bordc.org (last updated Feb. 6, 
2004). The initiative appears to have shifted public views toward the Patriot Act, prompting 
the Attorney General to launch an unprecedented speaking tour to seek to defend the Act. 
See David Cole, On the Road with Ashcroft, NATION, Sept. 22, 2003, at 22. 
103. Gross, supra note 14; Tushnet, supra note 14. Professor George Alexander before 
them made a similar argument, contending that because courts perform poorly in emergen­
cies, they should not get involved at all, and "redress must be achieved politically if it is to be 
effective." George J. Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National 
Courts During Periods of Emergency, 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 27, 65 (1984). 
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constitutional law for ordinary times with decisions rendered on the 
exercise of emergency authorities. Justice Jackson warned of precisely 
such danger in his dissent in Korematsu. He maintained that as 
threatening to liberty as the military order establishing Japanese 
internment was, "a judicial construction of the due process clause that 
will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the 
promulgation of the order itself." 104 He reasoned that the military 
order would last only so long as the emergency and could be lifted by 
a subsequent commander, but that 
once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it con­
forms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show 
that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has 
validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and 
of transplanting American citizens.105 
Justice Jackson's proposal was in fact far more modest than his 
critique. He argued that the civil courts ought not play a role in 
enforcing military orders.106 Korematsu's case arose from a criminal 
prosecution in civil court for violating the military's exclusion order, 
and Justice Jackson would have reversed the conviction on the ground 
that civilian courts ought not dirty their hands with the military's busi­
ness. But Jackson's proposal is as ineffectual as it is modest. It would 
have resolved Korematsu's case, but it would not have removed civil­
ian courts from the business of reviewing the legality of military deten­
tion. Other detainees might well have filed habeas corpus actions 
challenging the validity of their detention. Unless Justice Jackson was 
prepared to say that the courts could unilaterally suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus for any military detention, he could not have avoided 
the necessity of passing judgment on the military's actions. 
Mark Tushnet, in a thoughtful article provocatively titled 
Defending Korematsu?,107 cites Jackson's observations but takes them 
one step further. Not content with Jackson's prescription, Tushnet 
argues much more broadly for affirmative recognition of extraconsti­
tutional emergency powers: "it is better to have emergency powers 
exercised in an extraconstitutional way, so that everyone understands 
that the actions are extraordinary, than to have the actions rational­
ized away as consistent with the Constitution and thereby normal­
ized. "108 In his view, this is justified in order "to avoid normalizing the 
exception. "109 
104. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
105. Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
106. Id. at 247 (Jackson, J ., dissenting). 
107. Tushnet, supra note 14. 
108. Id. at 306. 
109. Id. at 307. 
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Oren Gross advocates a similar approach in much more detail in 
Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional?110 Gross contends, like Tushnet, that as a matter of 
reality we should candidly acknowledge that executive officials in 
times of crisis will act extraconstitutionally, and that we should do so 
in order to avoid "contaminat[ing]" the ordinary legal system with 
emergency powers.1 1 1  Gross would "inform public officials that they 
may act extralegally when they believe that such action is necessary 
for protecting the nation and the public in the face of calamity pro­
vided that they openly and publicly acknowledge the nature of their 
actions."1 1 2  Because on this view extralegal authority is expressly per­
mitted, the courts would not play a role in restraining such authority. 
Instead, it would "be up to the people to decide, either directly or 
indirectly (e.g., through their elected representatives in the legisla­
ture), how to respond to such actions.'' 1 13 Like Tushnet, Gross insists 
that his approach is aimed at "the preservation of the constitutional 
order and of its most fundamental principles and tenets."114 He argues 
that the requirement that officials seeking to exercise such powers 
must act openly in defiance of the law and throw themselves on the 
judgment of the people would serve as an important deterrent to 
executive abuse of emergency powers. 
These proposals are misguided. While I share to some extent the 
authors' skepticism about the ability of courts to protect the individual 
rights of those before them in national-security emergencies, both 
authors ignore the long-term benefits that judicial decisions in the 
national-security area have had in narrowing the range of rights­
violative options available to the government in the next emergency. 
Were courts to adopt the Gross-Tushnet notion that extraconstitu­
tional measures are appropriate during emergencies, and that the only 
real check is political, much would be lost and little gained in the pro­
tection of civil liberties. 
I would hesitate to adopt the Gross-Tushnet position for several 
reasons. First, it is predicated on a distinction between "emergency" 
p�riods and "normal" periods that, as Gross himself has convincingly 
shown, simply cannot be maintained. As Gross argues, "the belief in 
our ability to separate emergency from normalcy, counter-terrorism 
measures from the ordinary set of legal rules and norms," is a danger­
ous illusion.115 The United States has been under one state of emer-
1 10. Gross, supra note 14. 
1 11 .  Id. at 1133. 
1 12. Id. at 1023. 
1 13. Id. 
1 14. Id. at 1024. 
115 .  Gross, supra note 14, at 1022, 1069-96. 
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gency or another since 1933; by the mid-1970s, there were more than 
470 "emergency" laws on the books.116 Israel has been under an emer­
gency regime since it was established as a state more than fifty years 
ago. 1 17 And Great Britain has been under a state of emergency for 
most of the last thirty years, occasioned first by the IRA and later by 
the attacks of September llth. 1 18 Thus, emergency powers have a way 
of surviving long after the emergency has passed, and emergencies 
themselves may last decades. Emergency measures adopted in the 
United States today are especially likely to be long-lasting, given the 
nature of the war on terrorism, which is more like the war on drugs 
than a traditional war between nations. 1 19 When Donald Rumsfeld was 
asked when the war on terrorism would be over (and therefore when 
the Guantanamo enemy combatant detainees would be freed), he 
answered that the war would not be over until there were no longer 
any "effective global terrorist networks functioning in the world."120 
Vice President Richard Cheney has been even more candid, arguing 
that we should consider the current period not an emergency at all, 
but "the new normalcy. "121 
If the line between emergency and normal is evanescent, a doctrine 
of extraconstitutional authority cannot be safely cabined to emergency 
times. Far from protecting the Constitution in normal times, then, a 
doctrine expressly authorizing extralegal actions during emergencies 
would be at least as likely to contaminate the norm by expanding the 
realm of available government measures across the board as would 
insistence on a continuing role for courts and the Constitution in. 
checking emergency and nonemergency government action. 
Second, the Gross-Tushnet proposal to acknowledge extraconstitu­
tional power would be likely to undermine the protection of rights 
1 16. Glenn E. Fuller, Note, The National Emergency Dilemma: Balancing the 
Executive's Crisis Powers with the Need for Accountability, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1453 
( 1 979). When the Senate considered a balanced budget amendment in 1995, Senator Howell 
Heflin proposed a "national security" exception and implied that it would have been appro­
priately invoked some 200 times in the 220 years of the republic. See Theodore P. Seto, 
Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment That Does What It ls Supposed to Do (and 
No More), 1 06 YALE L.J. 1449, 1533 (1 997). 
117. Gross, supra note 14, at 1073. 
1 18. Id. at 1074. 
1 19. Tushnet concedes that the war on terrorism is more like a "condition" than an 
"emergency," but he does not explain how or even whether judges in his model would dis­
tinguish between the two. See Tushnet, supra note 14, at 297. 
120. News Transcript, Dep't of Defense News Briefing: Secretary Rumsfeld and General 
Myers (Mar. 28, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ transcripts/2002/ !03282002 
_t0328sd.html. 
12 1 .  Lynn Ludlow, Paper Tigers, S.F. CHRONICLE, Nov. 4, 2001, at C2; Bob Woodward, 
CIA Told To Do "Whatever Necessary " to Kill Bin Laden; Agency and Military Collobarat­
ing at " Unprecedented" Level; Cheney Says War Against Terror "May Never End, " WASH. 
POST, Oct. 21 , 2001 , at A l .  
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during emergencies (and by extension, during normal times that offi­
cials call emergencies). Gross claims that his proposal would have a 
salutary deterrent effect on official abuse of emergency powers, 
because officials could never be certain that their actions would in fact 
be ratified after the fact. And he argues that shifting the locus of justi­
fication and judgment from the judiciary to a political forum - the 
people or their elected representatives - would avoid the problem 
identified by Justice Jackson of formally authorizing emergency meas­
ures through judicial approval. 
There are substantial reasons, however, to doubt both of Gross's 
claims. Even if acknowledging the legitimacy of extralegal measures 
would avoid formal judicial approval, it would not avoid the creation 
of less formal precedents that could be pointed to later to justify fur­
ther incursions on liberties. The post hoc political rationalization pro­
cess that Gross envisions, while lacking the attributes of the formal le­
gal process, would nonetheless generate a more informal common law 
of extralegal emergency authorities. Once the political process has 
ratified a particular extralegal emergency action, officials will be able 
to point to that precedent as justification for their own subsequent 
actions. "Illegal" measures deemed permissible after the fact will no 
longer be clearly illegal, so long as a subsequent emergency can be 
analogized to the emergency found to warrant the illegal action previ­
ously.122 
Nor is it clear that the Gross-Tushnet proposal would have the 
effect of avoiding formal judicial approval of emergency measures. 
Even if we were to adopt such a scheme, public officials would be 
exceedingly unlikely to admit that their actions were extralegal. 
Rather, they would almost invariably argue first that their measures 
were constitutional and argue only in the alternative that their actions 
were justified even if illegal. 123 As a result, courts would continue to 
have to address the legality of emergency measures, and the drive to 
accommodate the Constitution to emergency conditions would con­
tinue to exert pressure on constitutional jurisprudence. Given the 
open-ended character of the Constitution and the fact that few of the 
liberties it protects are absolute, there will rarely be an emergency 
measure that government lawyers cannot defend with some constitu-
122. The 1988 statute offering restitution and an apology to the victims of the Japanese 
internment program suggests that at some point the political process may repudiate prior 
emergency measures. But that is almost certainly the exception that proves the rule. It took 
forty years to achieve and came only after the federal courts had themselves repudiated the 
convictions arising from the exclusion and internment programs. See supra note 26. Had the 
political process been asked to ratify the internment at the time, or in the decade or so that 
followed it, there is no evidence to suggest the result would have been repudiation rather 
than ratification. 
123. See FINN, supra note 54, at 9 (1991) ("Even public officials who propose action that 
is arguably extraconstitutional typically seek to justify their actions on constitutional 
grounds."). 
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tional argument. And while an open acknowledgment of the propriety 
of extralegal measures might reduce the hydraulic forces inducing 
courts to uphold emergency actions, the extent to which this would 
"save" normal constitutional law or deter abuse of emergency powers 
seems likely to be minimal. For the reasons stated above, courts would 
presumably still be reticent to rule against the government in emer­
gency periods. And the open acknowledgment of the validity of extra­
constitutional authority would seriously undercut the force of judicial 
decisions that now constrain emergency measures. 
From the standpoint of deterring the abuse of emergency author- , 
ity, the Gross-Tushnet proposal is not very different from what 
already exists. If a government official today adopts an extraconstitu- , 
tional response to an emergency and his actions are later declared 
unconstitutional, he may in theory be subject to civil or criminal sanc­
tions. But the likelihood that criminal or civil sanctions will be 
imposed is, in fact, virtually nil, and in any event the state nearly 
always indemnifies its officials from such liability.124 Moreover, such an 
official could always seek political post hoc ratification, in the form of 
immunity or indemnity from Congress or a pardon from the President. 
Thus, under the status quo, elected officials who act extraconstitution­
ally already face some, albeit limited, risk of liability, and have some 
political recourse to avoid liability. 
Third, there is little reason to trust the political process to do the 
job of judging that Gross and Tushnet would assign to it. The real dif­
ference under a Gross-Tushnet approach would be that the principal 
job of judging emergency measures would presumptively fall not on 
the courts but on the political process. But this seems the most dubi­
ous aspect of the proposal. If courts are not particularly reliable in · 
imposing limits on executive action during emergencies, the political 
process would almost certainly be worse. As Gross himself argues, the 
public and their elected representatives are especially prone to over­
reaction during times of crisis.125 The public is easily scared, and quick 
to approve of security measures launched in its name, especially if the 
measures do not directly affect the rights of the majority. Their elected 
representatives know that, and vote accordingly. Indeed, the very rea­
son that we adopted a Constitution was that we understood that the 
people and their representatives would be tempted to violate basic 
principles in times of stress. In the words of Senator John Stockton in 
1871: "Constitutions are chains with which men bind themselves in 
124. Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public, 
Officials' Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65 (1999) (critiquing the breadth of 
immunity doctrines and noting that indemnification of government officials is nearly univer­
sal). 
125. Gross, supra note 14, at 1035-42. 
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their sane moments that they may not die by a suicidal hand in the day 
of their frenzy."126 
Moreover, emergency measures almost always selectively target 
vulnerable groups and individuals, and foreign nationals in particular, 
making the political process an especially unreliable check on emer­
gency powers.127 This fact apparently does not concern Tushnet;128 but 
for those concerned with the human rights of the most vulnerable, 
proposals that point to political rather than judicial processes for 
assessing the validity of emergency measures are fatally flawed. 
Finally, Gross and Tushnet's proposal rests on the conventional 
wisdom that courts cannot be trusted to perform well in times of crisis. 
But the real question to be asked when assessing the courts' 
performance is: Compared to what? The courts are undoubtedly 
highly imperfect; but the alternatives are worse. One cannot rely on 
the executive branch to police itself in times of crisis. As Francis 
Biddle, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Attorney General, candidly 
acknowledged, "The Constitution has not bothered any wartime 
President."129 Executive officials after September 1 1th knew that they 
would take a much bigger "hit" politically if there were another 
terrorist act than if they locked up thousands of foreign nationals 
unconnected to terrorism. In such periods, executive officials ask for 
untrammeled authority, and assure the public that they will not abuse 
it. History shows that such trust is not warranted. 
Congress is also unlikely to be a guardian of civil liberties. Its 
overwhelming approval of the Smith Act130 and the Internal Security 
Act131 during the McCarthy era and of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act132 and the Patriot Act133 in the current era, coupled 
with its appropriation of funds for the Japanese internment in World 
126. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 574 (1871). 
127. COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 12; David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN . L. 
REV. 953 (2002); Gross, supra note 14, at 1037, 1082-85. 
128. Tushnet, supra note 14, at 296-97 (arguing that the Justice Department's selective 
targeting of Arab and Muslim foreign nationals for questioning, secret detentions and trials, 
and selective deportation "does not seem to be a violation of civil liberties," and if so, are 
only "violations of the rights of residents who are not U.S. citizens"). In my view, these ac­
tions violated a wide range of constitutional rights, and the fact that they specifically affected 
foreign nationals, the most vulnerable and voiceless among us, only exacerbates the wrongs. 
See generally COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 12. 
129. FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 219 (1962). 
130. Alien Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 (1940). 
131 .  Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81 -831, 64 Stat. 987. 
132. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214. 
133. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 1 15 
Stat. 272. 
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War II, illustrate that legislators are exceedingly unlikely to stand up 
against executive power in the name of civil liberties during emergen­
cies. The need to be seen as "doing something" about the threat often 
translates into legislation that delegates sweeping powers to the execu­
tive branch. 
Only the courts have an obligation to entertain claims of rights 
violations. The executive and legislative branches can simply choose to 
ignore such claims, and are likely to do so when those claims are not 
backed by substantial political power or influence. By contrast, 
assuming standing and justiciability, courts must adjudicate any claim 
that a government initiative violates constitutional rights. As a result, 
courts are often the only forum realistically available. For more than 
two years, the President has asserted the unilateral power to detain 
anyone he labels as an enemy combatant. Congress has done nothing 
to check or limit or even seriously address this assertion of power. The 
courts, by contrast, have addressed the question and issued multiple 
opinions, all of which are as of this writing headed for Supreme Court 
review. 
To cite another example, over the past decade and a half, I have 
represented thirteen foreign nationals whom the government accused 
of having ties to terrorist organizations and sought to detain or deport 
using classified evidence that the foreign nationals had no opportunity 
to confront or rebut.134 The government maintained that the individu­
als' presence in the United States threatened national security, and 
that revealing the evidence that proved that contention would itself 
endanger national security. All thirteen were eventually released 
without undermining national security, but only when we challenged 
the government's actions in court as a violation of due process. Of the 
thirteen, twelve were Arab and/or Muslim. The thirteenth was a 
Kenyan woman married to a Palestinian and accused of being associ­
ated with a Palestinian organization. 
What were our options in seeking to protect these individuals' con­
stitutional rights? Congress would not help them. The issue of secret 
evidence in immigration proceedings had been raised in Congress, but 
far from providing a remedy, in 1996 Congress expressly expanded 
and authorized its use in a number of immigration settings.135 The ex­
ecutive branch was equally unresponsive. It was the executive branch, 
after all, that invoked the tactic in the first place. Even under the ad­
ministration of President Bill Clinton, the executive branch was not a 
source of relief. And the public and the press, with a few exceptions, 
by and large paid little attention. When a court ordered an individual 
134. See generally David Cole, Secrecy, Guilt by Association, and the Terrorist Profile, 15 
J .L. & RELIGION 267 (2000-2001). 
135. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 401 (codified at 8 U .S.C. § 1531 
(2000)). 
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released, its decision would often receive coverage in the print media. 
But I received countless phone calls from television news producers 
over the years looking for legal stories, all of whom ultimately deter­
mined that the secret evidence story would not sell because it involved 
foreign nationals rather than citizens. 136 For my clients, it was court or 
nothing, court or more years of detention based on evidence they 
could not see. And to their credit, the courts were uniformly skeptical 
of the government's claims, and protective of the foreign nationals' 
right to see the evidence being used to deprive them of their liberty.137 
Even immigration judges, who as administrative judges ultimately re­
viewable by the Attorney General lack the independence of the fed­
eral courts, were highly skeptical of the government's claims.138 
Because courts are the only realistic option available to those 
targeted by emergency measures, and precisely because judges are all 
too human and already face substantial pressure to avoid fulfilling 
their responsibility, it seems especially misguided to advocate that they 
do so. The formal guarantees and ethical obligation of independence 
do not mean that judges are in fact always impartial and courageous, 
but the insistence that it is their obligation to be independent is critical 
to the enterprise of judging. We should not let judges off the hook 
when it comes to emergency matters, because they are the only real 
option for most persons targeted by emergency measures. As Fred 
Schauer has eloquently argued in a different setting, "The mere fact 
that courts will fold under pressure, however, does not dictate that 
they should be told that they may fold under pressure, because the 
effect of the message may be to increase the likelihood of folding even 
when the pressure is less."139 Schauer continued, "Resisting the inevi­
table is not to be desired because it will prevent the inevitable, but 
136. I am aware of only one exception. CBS's 60 Minutes covered the story of the gov­
ernment's use of secret evidence to deny entry to a group of Iraqis who had been involved in 
a failed CIA-backed coup attempt against Saddam Hussein, had been airlifted out of Iraq by 
the United States, but had then been determined at the border to have been double agents 
based on classified evidence. 60 Minutes: Unfinished Business: Six Iraqis Brought to the 
United States by the US Government for Help Against Saddam Hussein Are Imprisoned on 
Undisclosed Charges by the INS (CBS television broadcast, July 25, 1999). But it is likely that 
60 Minutes' interest in the story stemmed as much from the identity of the Iraqis' pro bono 
lawyer - former CIA Director James Woolsey - as from their predicament. 
137. See, e.g. , American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070 
(9th Cir. 1995); Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 512-13, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1 989); Al Najjar v. 
Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 273 F.3d 1330 
(11th Cir. 2001); Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999). 
138. See Cole, supra note 134, at 272-75. The immigration judges' skepticism suggests 
that relief was sometimes available within the executive branch. But it is significant that the 
relief came only from judges within the executive branch. 
139. Frederick Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1075, 1084 n.11 (1986). 
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because it may be the best strategy for preventing what is less inevita­
ble but more dangerous. "140 
In my view, the historical record does not demonstrate that courts 
will inevitably fold under the pressure of emergencies, but only that 
they will often do so. The historical developments reviewed above 
suggest that at least some judges may have learned from history to 
demand more narrowly tailored responses to emergencies. But more 
important, the record also shows that by exercising their responsibility 
to decide cases pitting individual rights against emergency executive 
power, the courts have over time developed rules that do constrain the 
executive in the next emergency. The danger of Gross and Tushnet's 
proposal is that we would be sacrificing even that for benefits that 
seem evanescent at best. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts, like every other institution of human governance, are 
imperfect. Tasked with the job of enforcing individual constitutional 
rights against the majority's will, judges remain prone to the same 
fears and anxieties that afflict us all during times of crisis. Thus, it 
should not be a surprise that courts have all too often deferred to 
unfounded assertions of government power on issues of national secu­
rity; when the executive claims that the fate of the nation is at stake, it 
takes real courage to stand up to that assertion and subject it to careful 
scrutiny. 
At the same time, the conventional wisdom that courts have failed 
during times of crisis is itself overstated. It is based both on a snapshot 
view of the courts' decisions, and on an overly idealized vision of what 
is in fact possible. When considered over time, courts have played a 
valuable role in reviewing and ultimately restraining some of the more 
egregious rights violations undertaken in the name of saving the coun­
try. Judicial decisions, while rarely providing relief to the initial vic­
tims of a crisis mentality, have played a role in restricting the options 
available to the government in the next emergency. Like Marbury v. 
Madison itself, these decisions may well be more important over the 
long run than their bottom lines would make them appear in the short 
run. 
Given the salutary role that courts have played in enforcing consti­
tutional limits on emergency responses, and given the paucity of 
credible alternatives, we should be reluctant to let judges off the hook. 
There seems to be little reason to trust the political branches to be 
more attentive to constitutional rights concerns than courts, even if 
courts themselves do not always perform as we might hope they 
140. Id. at 1085. 
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would. As Eugene Rostow argued in assessing the Japanese 
internment cases shortly after they were decided, "It is hard to imag­
ine what courts are for if not to protect people against unconstitutional 
arrest. . . .  It is essential to every democratic value in society that offi­
cial action taken in the name of the war power be held to standards of 
responsibility. "141 
141. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases - A  Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 
511 ,  514 (1945). 
